Dismissing the Arbitrary

Dismissing The Arbitrary

To dismiss a claim as "arbitrary" is not the equivalent of pleading ignorance or confessing indecision or suspending judgment. It is not the same as saying "I don't know" or "I haven't made up my mind" or "I have no opinion." These responses presuppose that an issue has a connection to human cognition; they presuppose that there is some evidence pertaining to the issue and, therefore, that it is legitimate to consider, even though one may be unable for various reasons to untangle it.[1]

This is reffered to as "justifiable ignorance." For example:

If someone asks a man whether there are gremlins on Venus, however, there is no justification for the reply "I don't know." What doesn't he know? What evidence has he failed to study or been unable to clarify? What is the basis to believe that there is anything to learn on this subject? If the gremlin claim is arbitrary, there is no such basis. In this situation, the proper response is: "I do know. I know that any such claim is to be thrown out as inadmissible."[2]

Dismissing arbitrary claims does not mean you're uncertain or ignorant about the issue. It means you recognize the claim is non-cognitive and therefore irrelevant. You must not suspend judgment; you must recognize the arbitrary as unthinkable and dismiss it. The arbitrary, when truly recognized, cannot be cognitively processed. Recognizing this prevents being misled by seemingly plausible but inherently arbitrary claims. Advocates of the arbitrary may sneak in such claims under the guise of reasonableness. To avoid this, one must reject arbitrary claims outright, recognizing that engaging with them undermines rational thought.

[...] For dismissal, the most that one needs is to show that one is informed of the state of the evidence and has found that there is none supporting the idea. (This is not a claim to be aware of non-existence: it means that one has looked where that evidence should have been but has found only data different from evidence for the assertion.)[3]


  1. OPAR, p. 169 ↩︎

  2. OPAR, p. 169 ↩︎

  3. How We Know, p. 309 ↩︎